











Opportunity cost of CO2 emission reductions: 







Presentamos evidencia empírica sobre convergencia en magnitudes medioambientales para países 
desarrollados y en vías de desarrollo. Además, partiendo de un modelo standard "putty-clay" de 
uso de energía, introducimos un stock de contaminación sobre el que se fija un objetivo de reduc-
ción de emisiones. El análisis teórico ofrece indicaciones sobre qué variables deberían ser objeto de 
futuros acuerdos de reducción de emisiones entre países heterogéneos. 
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We present some empirical evidence on convergence of environmental magnitudes for a pool of 
developing and developed countries. Additional, we enlarge a standard model of energy use with 
putty-clay technology in order to allow for a stock of pollution, on which a target on emission re-
ductions is set out in finite horizon. The theoretical analysis offers some insights on what variables 
should serve as basis of emission reduction target agreements among heterogeneous parties. 
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1. Introduction  
To promote international coordination on 
CO2 emission reductions is nowadays -in one 
way or another- at the forefront of the envi-
ronmental policy of virtually any country in 
the world. This coordination has been so far 
materialised as the signing of agreements by 
sovereign countries to commit themselves to 
reduce their respective CO2 emissions. From 
the raw perspective of a theoretic economist, 
this is a tragedy of the commons problem: 
there is no supranational entity that can en-
force countries to sign, the costs of reductions 
are individually paid -at a country level- and 
its benefits are worldwide collected. This being 
so, it seems natural that road map to the sign-
ing of the agreement be not a pleasant walk. 
 
This paper addresses one of the most contro-
versial issues of that road map. Because the 
concerned countries’ economies are heteroge-
neous, we all agree that the emission reduc-
tions should be heterogeneous across coun-
tries as well. But the devil is in the details: 
what do we exactly mean by heterogeneous 
economies? and how that heterogeneity 
should be mapped into heterogeneity in the 
emission reductions? 
 
The previous two questions summarize the 
two main objectives of this paper, and their 
order mimics the order in which they are ana-
lyzed. The first is rather positive whereas the 
second has clearly a normative angle. Our ap-
proach in the positive part is to take data for a 
pool of countries which are a priori -yet in a 
vague sense- heterogeneous and apply well-
known econometric techniques at use, estima-
tion of convergence equations, to relate eco-
nomic growth and pollution emissions. Per-
haps the more paradigmatic example of het-
erogeneous economies is that of developed 
versus emerging economies. Additionally, we 
must bear in mind, if we are to stress hetero-
geneity between developed and developing 
economies, that developed economies should 
not be themselves too heterogeneous, and the 
like applies for their developing partners. All 
in all, our pool is composed of the G7-group 
and seven emerging Latin American econo-
mies1. 
                                                 
1The G7-group is conformed by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom and the United States of America. The 
Latin American countries we take are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
The normative part of this paper takes a step 
beyond the econometrics. The previous part 
essentially measures the observed relationship 
between pollution emissions and economic 
growth, but: how does this relationship change 
when the economy is pushed further to ac-
complish a hypothetical emission reduction 
agreement? For that, we need to postulate how 
the agents of the economy will react to some-
thing that has not been experienced so far. In 
short, we need a theoretical model of growth 
and pollution. In the normative part of this 
work we use such a model together with well-
known axiomatic concepts of bargaining in 
order to predict the likelihood of emission 
reduction agreements between the pool of 
countries under consideration2. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. 
Next section presents the numerical analysis. 
Sections 3 and 4 contain the model and the 
theoretical analysis, respectively. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Empirical analysis 
 
We have a balanced sample of 14 countries: 
the G7 group together with seven Latin Ameri-
can emerging economies. The former are Can-
ada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, 
whereas the latter are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. For 
each country, we take per capita data on C02 
emissions, energy consumption and GDP. All 
time series have yearly frequency, and the 
sample period is 1980 to 2006, both included3. 
 
In this part we essentially focus on the study of 
convergence across countries. The literature 
on convergence typically distinguishes two 
sorts of convergence, called beta and sigma 
convergence, respectively. Essentially, and 
                                                                         
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Both groups have been 
alphabetically listed. 
 
2There is a branch of literature that explicits -and measures- how 
home markets within a country are connected themselves and 
uses that information to predict impacts of environmental 
policies. These are the so-called computable general equilibrium 
models. For the sake of tractability and since we want to focus 
on inter rather intra-country allocations, the spirit of this paper 
is to view each country as an atom: we look at its aggregate 
behavior regardless its internal economic structure. 
3 The data source are EIA for energy and emissions and IMF for 
GDP. 
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referred, for instance to per-capita emissions, 
by beta convergence we mean that countries 
with larger initial levels of emissions (at the 
start of the sample period) have experienced 
larger reductions in emissions thereafter. By 
sigma convergence we mean that the intra-
period cross-country variance of emissions 
reduces over time. Roughly, beta convergence 
is convergence of the conditional expectation 
whereas sigma convergence is convergence of 
the unconditional variance of the time series 
under consideration. 
 
The econometric study of convergence is pre-
sented in the tables at the end of the paper. We 
basically consider four variables: the combina-
tions from CO2 and energy use (labelled as 
CO2 and ENE in the table, resp.) with per 
capita and intensity units (prefix PC and IN, 
resp.). The intensity of CO2 emissions are 
emissions per unit of GDP, and intensity of 
energy use has an analogous definition. In 
some tables we present also measures of con-
vergence of per capita GDP in yellow columns 
as a benchmark. 
 
We start with beta convergence. The Table 1 
shows the result of cross-section regressions of 
the overall growth rate over the sample period 
against the initial level. A negative coefficient 
of the initial level indicates beta-convergence, 
also called absolute beta-convergence (see 
Sala-i-Marti(1996)). The first and the second 
column for each magnitude (PC-CO2, PC-
ENE, IN-CO2 and IN-INE) show that coeffi-
cient without taking and taking into account 
GDP effects, respectively. The results on over-
all convergence are weak -to say the best- for 
variable measured in per capita units while 
they are more robust for the same variables 
measured in intensity units. 
The table 2 takes a closer look on beta conver-
gence. It shows time-series regressions for 
each country in which the yearly growth rate 
is regressed against previous year’s level. As 
before, a negative coefficient associated to the 
previous year’s level shows conditional beta 
convergence (the notation was firstly intro-
duced by Sala-i-Marti(1996)). The first and 
third column for each magnitude show the 
corresponding coefficient without incorporat-
ing and incorporating per capita GDP as an 
additional regressor, that is, discounting GDP 
effects. The second and fourth columns are 
standard deviations of the corresponding coef-
ficients. The table shows a pattern of conver-
gence which is relatively stable across coun-
tries and across magnitudes, particularly if 
GDP is discounted. 
 
Finally, table 3 shows results on sigma conver-
gence. We present two measures. The first is 
standard on the literature on GDP conver-
gence: the evolution of coefficient of variation 
along time. This is labelled as ”sigma-con” in 
the table for each magnitude. It shows a slow 
reduction over time, which indicates sigma 
convergence, in sharp contrast with the evolu-
tion of ”sigma-con GDP”, in the yellow part, 
which is the same statistic referred to the GDP. 
 
Additionally, table 3 presents a second meas-
ure on convergence: a standard inequality in-
dex, which is presented in the columns la-
belled as ”ine-ind”. For a given year, it is com-
puted as the supreme norm of the cumulative 
normalized frequency of observed values and 
the corresponding one to a perfectly uniform 
distribution. Thus, the index lies in [0, 1] and 
the closer to zero, the closer both frequencies 
are or, equivalently, the lesser is the heteroge-
neity across countries. The results for this al-
ternative measure are in line with those for the 
coefficient of variation. 
 
Table1: overall convergente 
 
 PC_CO2    IN_CO2  
 beta disc_GDP   beta disc_GDP 
estim. -0,09 -0,13  estim. -0,39 -0,20 
std 0,07 0,07  std 0,14 0,14 
       
 PC_ENE    IN_INE  
 beta disc_GDP   beta disc_GDP 
estim. -0,09 -0,10  estim. -0,37 -0,14 
std 0,06 0,06  std 0,15 0,15 
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Table 2: beta convergence 
 
 PC_CO2      
 beta_conv std beta_conv_disc std beta_GDP std_GDP 
CA -0,21 0,13 -0,57 0,14 0,04 0,01 
FR -0,34 0,06 -0,31 0,07 0,02 0,01 
GE -0,04 0,06 -0,36 0,16 0,02 0,01 
IT -0,03 0,06 -0,51 0,18 0,00 0,01 
JA -0,03 0,07 -0,53 0,14 0,01 0,02 
UK -0,20 0,10 -0,40 0,17 0,04 0,01 
US -0,43 0,15 -0,57 0,16 0,03 0,01 
AR -0,23 0,18 -0,72 0,19 0,06 0,05 
BR -0,01 0,05 -0,40 0,12 0,04 0,02 
CH 0,00 0,05 -0,48 0,15 0,05 0,02 
CO -0,43 0,17 -0,45 0,18 0,04 0,02 
ME -0,43 0,20 -0,61 0,20 0,05 0,03 
PE -0,16 0,10 -0,14 0,11 0,09 0,05 
VE -0,42 0,15 -0,38 0,17 0,01 0,09 
 PC_ENE      
 beta_conv std beta_conv_disc std beta_GDP std_GDP 
CA -0,12 0,11 -0,56 0,18 0,04 0,01 
FR -0,01 0,05 -0,39 0,14 0,02 0,01 
GE -0,15 0,07 -0,17 0,13 0,02 0,01 
IT 0,00 0,04 -0,61 0,16 0,00 0,01 
JA -0,02 0,04 -0,32 0,13 0,01 0,02 
UK -0,18 0,11 -0,32 0,17 0,04 0,01 
US -0,22 0,13 -0,40 0,16 0,03 0,01 
AR -0,02 0,10 -0,81 0,15 0,06 0,05 
BR 0,01 0,03 -0,27 0,10 0,04 0,02 
CH 0,03 0,03 -0,61 0,13 0,05 0,02 
CO -0,39 0,15 -0,47 0,16 0,04 0,02 
ME -0,12 0,15 -0,86 0,21 0,05 0,03 
PE -0,17 0,10 -0,16 0,10 0,09 0,05 
VE -0,22 0,14 -0,61 0,14 0,01 0,09 
 IN_CO2      
 beta_conv std beta_conv_disc std beta_GDP std_GDP 
CA -0,13 0,05 -0,48 0,11 0,04 0,01 
FR -0,18 0,03 -0,26 0,06 0,02 0,01 
GE 0,03 0,04 -0,19 0,09 0,02 0,01 
IT -0,14 0,08 -0,58 0,17 0,00 0,01 
JA -0,23 0,06 -0,26 0,09 0,01 0,02 
UK -0,04 0,03 -0,17 0,12 0,04 0,01 
US -0,07 0,02 -0,34 0,06 0,03 0,01 
AR -0,34 0,14 -0,42 0,14 0,06 0,05 
BR -0,07 0,06 -0,09 0,12 0,04 0,02 
CH -0,50 0,17 -0,51 0,17 0,05 0,02 
CO -0,10 0,10 -0,56 0,20 0,04 0,02 
ME -0,08 0,10 -0,81 0,18 0,05 0,03 
PE -0,15 0,14 -0,79 0,18 0,09 0,05 
VE -0,39 0,17 -0,37 0,16 0,01 0,09 
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Table 2: beta convergente 
 
 IN_ENE      
 beta_conv std beta_conv_disc std beta_GDP std_GDP 
CA -0,02 0,05 -0,38 0,15 0,04 0,01 
FR -0,20 0,09 -0,50 0,15 0,02 0,01 
GE -0,01 0,03 -0,43 0,15 0,02 0,01 
IT -0,17 0,06 -0,34 0,12 0,00 0,01 
JA -0,34 0,09 -0,36 0,11 0,01 0,02 
UK -0,02 0,03 -0,57 0,16 0,04 0,01 
US -0,06 0,02 -0,37 0,08 0,03 0,01 
AR -0,27 0,10 -0,24 0,11 0,06 0,05 
BR -0,07 0,04 -0,03 0,09 0,04 0,02 
CH -0,50 0,16 -0,50 0,16 0,05 0,02 
CO -0,13 0,13 -0,72 0,19 0,04 0,02 
ME -0,13 0,10 -0,31 0,11 0,05 0,03 
PE -0,27 0,18 -0,93 0,18 0,09 0,05 
VE -0,24 0,10 -0,18 0,14 0,01 0,09 
Table 3: sigma convergence and inequality 
 
 PC_CO2     IN_CO2    
 sigma_con ine_ind sigma_conGDP ine_indGDP  sigma_con ine_ind sigma_conGDP ine_indGDP 
1980 0,83 0,32 0,49 0,22 1980 0,42 0,15 0,49 0,22 
1981 0,82 0,32 0,50 0,22 1981 0,41 0,16 0,50 0,22 
1982 0,80 0,31 0,51 0,23 1982 0,39 0,15 0,51 0,23 
1983 0,81 0,32 0,53 0,24 1983 0,37 0,15 0,53 0,24 
1984 0,83 0,32 0,54 0,25 1984 0,37 0,14 0,54 0,25 
1985 0,83 0,32 0,56 0,26 1985 0,37 0,15 0,56 0,26 
1986 0,83 0,32 0,55 0,25 1986 0,37 0,15 0,55 0,25 
1987 0,84 0,32 0,55 0,26 1987 0,38 0,15 0,55 0,26 
1988 0,85 0,33 0,57 0,26 1988 0,37 0,15 0,57 0,26 
1989 0,84 0,32 0,59 0,28 1989 0,37 0,14 0,59 0,28 
1990 0,83 0,32 0,60 0,28 1990 0,36 0,14 0,60 0,28 
1991 0,81 0,32 0,58 0,27 1991 0,35 0,14 0,58 0,27 
1992 0,82 0,32 0,58 0,27 1992 0,36 0,14 0,58 0,27 
1993 0,82 0,32 0,57 0,26 1993 0,35 0,14 0,57 0,26 
1994 0,82 0,31 0,57 0,26 1994 0,36 0,14 0,57 0,26 
1995 0,81 0,31 0,57 0,27 1995 0,36 0,14 0,57 0,27 
1996 0,80 0,30 0,57 0,27 1996 0,36 0,14 0,57 0,27 
1997 0,80 0,30 0,56 0,26 1997 0,36 0,13 0,56 0,26 
1998 0,79 0,29 0,57 0,26 1998 0,35 0,13 0,57 0,26 
1999 0,80 0,30 0,59 0,27 1999 0,34 0,13 0,59 0,27 
2000 0,80 0,30 0,59 0,28 2000 0,34 0,13 0,59 0,28 
2001 0,79 0,30 0,60 0,28 2001 0,36 0,13 0,60 0,28 
2002 0,81 0,31 0,61 0,28 2002 0,39 0,14 0,61 0,28 
2003 0,81 0,31 0,61 0,28 2003 0,38 0,14 0,61 0,28 
2004 0,80 0,31 0,60 0,28 2004 0,36 0,13 0,60 0,28 
2005 0,79 0,30 0,59 0,27 2005 0,35 0,13 0,59 0,27 




3. Theoretical model 
 
In this section we present a theoretical model 
in order to predict the countries’ behavior 
when facing emission reduction targets. The 
model must satisfy two essential characteris-
tics. First, we look for a model able to repro-
duce -at least qualitatively some observed facts 
related to pollution. Second, because an emis-
sion reduction target is essentially an emission 
ceiling and a deadline at which it must be hit, 
a finite-time horizon should be handable 
within our setting. 
 
We basically build on Atkenson and Kehoe 
(1999). Greenhouse gas emissions are inevita-
bly connected to energy use or, more exactly, 
to the use of those energy types that have 
served as a basis for economic growth world-
wide along the recent decades. The model 
proposed by Atkenson and Kehoe delivers a 
basic feature observed in the use of those types 
of energy: it reacts very slowly to changes in 
energy prices4. Their theoretical explanation to 
that fact is as follows. In the economy there is 
a state of knowledge represented by a list of 
possible capital types. Each type must be used 
together with energy in a fixed proportion, and 
that proportion varies across types. Now, at 
any given moment in time it is given the histo-
gram of capital types, that is, it is given how 
many units of each capital type are there, and 
all the economic agents can do in the short run 
is to use energy accordingly. In the long run, 
by making type-specific investments, the 
agents can modify the shape of the histogram. 
Taking up this central idea, we basically depar-
ture from Atkenson and Kehoe in two direc-
tions. First, we include a mapping from energy 
use to pollution emissions. Second, they 
mostly perform an analysis of the steady state 
of the economy, whereas we need to make 
some different -and standard- assumptions on 
                                                 
4 Because in our model we want to focus on the effect of pollu-
tion emission targets on the countries behavior, we do not 
include energy prices in our model. Precisely the relatively low 
short run elasticity to energy prices justifies to neglect the effect 
of those prices in a finite horizon analysis. 
 PC_ENE     IN_ENE    
 sigma_con ine_ind sigma_conGDP ine_indGDP  sigma_con ine_ind sigma_conGDP ine_indGDP 
1980 0,89 0,32 0,49 0,22 1980 0,46 0,15 0,49 0,22 
1981 0,87 0,32 0,50 0,22 1981 0,44 0,15 0,50 0,22 
1982 0,86 0,31 0,51 0,23 1982 0,43 0,15 0,51 0,23 
1983 0,86 0,32 0,53 0,24 1983 0,42 0,15 0,53 0,24 
1984 0,87 0,32 0,54 0,25 1984 0,41 0,15 0,54 0,25 
1985 0,88 0,32 0,56 0,26 1985 0,40 0,14 0,56 0,26 
1986 0,87 0,32 0,55 0,25 1986 0,41 0,15 0,55 0,25 
1987 0,87 0,32 0,55 0,26 1987 0,41 0,15 0,55 0,26 
1988 0,89 0,32 0,57 0,26 1988 0,40 0,14 0,57 0,26 
1989 0,88 0,32 0,59 0,28 1989 0,40 0,15 0,59 0,28 
1990 0,86 0,32 0,60 0,28 1990 0,38 0,14 0,60 0,28 
1991 0,84 0,32 0,58 0,27 1991 0,39 0,14 0,58 0,27 
1992 0,85 0,31 0,58 0,27 1992 0,40 0,14 0,58 0,27 
1993 0,84 0,31 0,57 0,26 1993 0,40 0,14 0,57 0,26 
1994 0,84 0,31 0,57 0,26 1994 0,41 0,15 0,57 0,26 
1995 0,84 0,31 0,57 0,27 1995 0,40 0,15 0,57 0,27 
1996 0,83 0,31 0,57 0,27 1996 0,40 0,15 0,57 0,27 
1997 0,82 0,30 0,56 0,26 1997 0,40 0,14 0,56 0,26 
1998 0,80 0,29 0,57 0,26 1998 0,39 0,14 0,57 0,26 
1999 0,82 0,30 0,59 0,27 1999 0,38 0,14 0,59 0,27 
2000 0,81 0,30 0,59 0,28 2000 0,37 0,13 0,59 0,28 
2001 0,79 0,29 0,60 0,28 2001 0,38 0,14 0,60 0,28 
2002 0,81 0,30 0,61 0,28 2002 0,40 0,14 0,61 0,28 
2003 0,81 0,30 0,61 0,28 2003 0,40 0,14 0,61 0,28 
2004 0,81 0,30 0,60 0,28 2004 0,38 0,14 0,60 0,28 
2005 0,80 0,29 0,59 0,27 2005 0,38 0,13 0,59 0,27 
2006 0,78 0,28 0,58 0,27 2006 0,36 0,13 0,58 0,27 
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the functional forms in order to allow for a 
finite horizon analysis5 
 
We consider continuous time, indexed by t 
(with t ≥ 0). Time subscript is omitted where 
it is unambiguous. There are two types of capi-
tal in the economy, denoted by kp and ka, re-
spectively. If each type of capital is character-
ized by the proportion in which it uses energy, 
and energy use generates pollution, we claim 
that each capital type is equivalently defined 
by the amount pollution it generates per unit 
of capital. Let p be the stock of pollution in the 
economy, we assume its dynamics is given by 
 
         (1) 
 
where τ ≥ 0 is the natural abatement rate and h 
and g are strictly increasing and differentiable 
functions with h (0) = g (0) = 0. In words, kp 
generates pollution whereas ka generates 
abatement. In addition, we assume kp gener-
ates output according to some standard pro-
duction function f whereas ka does not. Output 
can be allocated either to consumption or to 
type-specific investment. Denoting consump-
tion by c and j-type investment by xj (being j 
™ {p, a}), the feasibility constraint of the econ-
omy is 
 
          (2) 
In turn, the dynamics of the j-type of capital is 
 
           (3) 
 
where δ is the depreciation rate, assumed con-
stant across capital types6 
 
Our model economy is ruled by a representa-
tive agent that obtains utility exclusively from 
consumption and does not obtain disutility 
from pollution7. Let us denote by u its instan-
                                                 
5 In fact we are not even studing the transitional dynamics 
towards a steady state. We discuss more on this issue latter on. 
6 Our two-type economy is an extremely simplified case of 
Atkenson and Kehoe’s model, who consider an arbitrary set of 
capital types. While adding complexity to the analysis, we claim 
that a further generalization in this direction does not bring new 
insights to our central question. 
7 7As mentioned, greenhouse gas emissions are a tragedy-of-the-
commons-problem: the cost of reducing emissions are indivi-
dually paid whereas benefits from reductions are worldwide 
collected. Here we adopt the point of view of a single country: it 
must make an effort to reduce its emissions, whose stock is 
given by p, but only the aggregate stock across all countries 
taneous utility function and by r to the time 
discount parameter. Finally, an emission re-
duction target is essentially a pair (T, ¯p), 
which indicates that the stock of pollution at 
time T cannot exceed ¯p. Let us suppose that 
such a target is signed at time 0, being T > 0. 
Then the problem for the agent is 
 
  (4) 
 
subject to pT ≤ ¯p, the feasibility constraint (2) 
and the dynamics (3) and (1). The second 
term in (4) is a post-target salvage value. 
Roughly, the agent anticipates that life will go 
on after the agreement deadline and conse-
quently he values to get to that time with some 
positive amounts of capital. The value for j-
type capital is bj . 
 
4. Analysis of the model 
 
4.1. THE BASIC FORCES 
 
In order to apply the model to the data, we 
need to assume concrete functional forms. 
That will be done in the next subsection. Be-
fore such specific assumptions come into 
scene, we find convenient to perform some 
analysis in order to stress the essential effects 
we have included in our theoretical setting. 
This is the purpose of this subsection. 
 
Once an emission reduction target is fixed, our 
model is a deterministic finite horizon optimal 
control problem. Although kept to a mini-
mum, the use of some terminology of optimal 
control eases the presentation. The next 
proposition shows that our model delivers a 
standard consumption vs. investment trade-off 
together with also an standard equal revenue 
to investment across capital types rule. 
 
Proposition 1. Let n denote the current-value 
co-state associated to pollution. 
 
Under the optimal policy of (4) subject to (1), 
(2) and (3), it is 
 
                                                                         
enters its utility. If the country is small enough, such aggregate 










The proof is left to the appendix. Assume to 
start that there is no emission target and, con-
sequently, there is no investment in ka. Then 
(5) with n = 0 drives the basic dynamics of the 
economy, reflecting the usual rule in the dy-
namics of the consumption as a function of the 
stock of productive capital, kp. 
 
Now we introduce a target on emission reduc-
tion and, therefore, some investment in ka is 
necessary8. There is an immediate conse-
quence. At any point in time, an additional 
increase in the stock of pollution obliges to 
additional investment in ka and, inevitably, to 
additional reductions in consumption. In 
short, an additional increase of pollution at 
any point in time worsens the functional ob-
jective, and that is what the negative sign of nt 
accounts for. In addition, its time derivative is 
negative simply because the latter the addi-
tional increase in pollution takes place, the 
lesser time is left to make it compatible with 
reaching the target. The latter term in (5) is 
negative, indicating that if kp were exoge-
nously fixed at its no-target level at every t, 
then increases in consumption would be 
smaller (or reductions would be larger) than 
its no target counterpart simply because some 
consumption should be re-allocated to further 
investment in ka. 
 
The equation (6) is just a rule for the dynam-
ics of consumption in terms of ka as well. In 
essence, the standard rule in a capital accumu-
lation model without pollution compares the 
time derivative of consumption with the mar-
ginal productivity of capital net from deprecia-
tion and time discount. This is (5), where the 
marginal productivity of kp is not only the first 
                                                 
8 We assume implicitly that the emission target is not reached 
under a business-as-usual policy, that is, the target is not super-
fluous. 
term in the right hand side, but also its mar-
ginal effect on pollution, embodied in the lat-
ter term of its right hand side. And that is also 
(6), where the first term of the right hand side 
is the marginal productivity of ka. Finally, di-
rect comparison of (5) and (6) leads to (7), 
which states that the marginal productivity of 
kp and ka, left and right hand side, respectively, 
must equal each other at every t. 
 
4.2. TARGETS AND DYNAMICS 
 
In this subsection we assume the following 
functional forms: U(c) = ln(c), f(kp) = kp 
α, 
h(kp) = θh kp and g(ka) = θg ka. Under these 
functional forms, the dynamics can be solved 
for c such that, from Proposition 1, we have: 
 
         (7) 
 
Consequently, the consumption reduces 
monotonically over time in the economy. 
Equation (8) shows the rate of reduction in 
consumption depends on parameters of the 
model (eventually different across countries), 
whereas its final level depends on the targets 
on emissions. More interestingly, for a given 
target, the final level on consumption depends 
crucially on kp / ka, that is, the ratio of produc-
tive to abatement capital. In order to solve the 
dynamics of the model, notice that once a so-
lution in c to (8) is given, we obtain straight-
forwardly the evolution for kp from (7). From 




which is nothing but the evolution of the ag-
gregate stock of capital in the economy. Now, 
given an evolution for both types of capital, 
the evolution for p is given by (1), for which 
the target constitutes a boundary condition. 
 
The dynamics can be synthesized in a phase-
diagram in the kp ka plane. From a given initial 
point in it, that is, a pair of values (kp, ka), 
there is a unique trajectory that goes to a north 
eastern final point (thus increasing both types 
of capital), following the previous dynamics, 
in which the target is exactly met. We can also 
define a map of indifference curves with regard 
to the initial point. Roughly, any two distinct 
initial points placed in the same indifference 
curve lead the economy to different final north 
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eastern points, but the representative con-
sumer is indifferent among the consumption 
paths induced from those trajectories. Nu-
merical analysis reveals that the indifferent 
curves are strictly increasing functions. 
 
To understand the practical relevance of the 
previous analysis, notice that a pair (kp, ka) 
determines a unique value of the ratio 
 
           (9) 
 
The numerator are the emissions at a given 
instant, whereas the denominator is the total 
output of the economy, thus the ratio are the 
emissions measured in units of intensity. The 
previous analysis thus shows that the relevant 
variable to measure how much effort a country 
must make in order to met an emission reduc-
tion target is not given by its initial per capita 
emissions (assuming that our economy is 
composed by a single individual, that is just 
the numerator), but its initial intensity of 
emissions. So long as that ratio converges over 
time, as the analysis of the previous section 
suggests, there seem to be increasing reasons 





We use standard econometric techniques on 
the study of convergence of environmental 
magnitudes for a pool of developing and de-
veloped countries. We also present a first at-
tempt to build on a model of energy use to 
study finite-horizon targets on emission reduc-
tion agreements. Preliminary as it is, our 
analysis so far suggests that such agreements 
among targets should be contingent on a larger 
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